Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP Listed by Qilin Ransomware Group

On October 28, 2025, law firm Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP appeared on the leak site operated by the qilin ransomware group. The attackers claim to have exfiltrated internal files from the firm’s systems during a ransomware incident. Anyone whose personal information was stored in those files — clients, employees, or their families — may now face heightened risk of identity theft, doxxing, or targeted fraud.

What Public Reporting Shows

Public reporting indicates the firm was listed on the qilin leak site with an announcement that internal data had been stolen. Available details describe the exposure as internal files rather than a specific list of customer records, though law firms routinely hold sensitive documents containing names, addresses, Social Security numbers, financial details, and case-related personal information. No exact victim count has been released. The listing appeared on October 28, 2025, and follows the group’s standard pattern of publishing samples or full datasets when ransom demands are not met.

Why This Matters for You and Your Family

If you or any member of your family ever worked with or were represented by Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, your private information could be sitting in one of those stolen files. A single breach like this can supply criminals with enough pieces to open accounts in your name, file fraudulent tax returns, or begin building a profile for more aggressive targeting. For families, the exposure often reaches spouses, children, and shared addresses, turning one professional relationship into a household-wide vulnerability. Even if you never received a direct notification, the absence of confirmed victim numbers means you cannot safely assume your data stayed out of the leak.

The Doxxing and Identity-Chain Implications

Ransomware groups rarely stop at posting generic files. Once internal documents leave a law firm’s network, attackers and subsequent buyers can map connections between email addresses, phone numbers, client names, and family members. These identity chains grow quickly: a leaked work email leads to personal accounts, which lead to social-media handles, which lead to children’s gaming usernames. Credential leaks of this nature frequently cascade into account takeovers across email, banking, and gaming platforms. Public reporting on similar incidents shows that children’s gaming accounts are often among the first to be hijacked because parental credentials reused across services provide an easy entry point.