Ekepis Listed by The Gentlemen Ransomware Group

Your account details with Ekepis have been listed by The Gentlemen Ransomware Group on their leak site. The group claims to have obtained files from the organisation, including at least one password field, though no technical details about how those credentials were stored have been disclosed.

This means the listing creates uncertainty for anyone who had an account there. While nothing permanent such as government identifiers may have been exposed, the presence of a password field means you should treat your old Ekepis login as potentially compromised until you hear otherwise from the successor organisation. The company itself has not publicly confirmed the incident as of writing.

What the listing actually shows about your account

The Gentlemen Ransomware Group says it obtained data from Ekepis, an organisation later absorbed into Greece’s EOPPEP (National Organisation for the Certification of Qualifications and Vocational Guidance). According to the listing, the material includes a password field. Because the storage scheme was never disclosed, it is impossible to know whether those passwords were protected in a way that resists cracking or were stored in a form that could be used more directly.

What this enables depends entirely on that unknown detail. If the passwords were stored insecurely, anyone who obtains the list could attempt to use your old Ekepis credentials on other sites where you reused the same password. If they were properly hashed and salted with a strong, slow algorithm, mass cracking becomes far more difficult and time-consuming. The listing itself gives you no way to tell which situation applies.

No permanent personal identifiers such as national ID numbers, dates of birth tied to biographic records, or similar government-linked data appear in the published description. That removes one major long-term risk that often appears in other incidents. Your Ekepis account itself is now defunct, so the immediate risk is credential reuse rather than someone logging into an active service.

How much should you believe a ransomware leak-site listing

A leak-site listing is an accusation made by the extortion group, not an independent verification. Ransomware operators frequently post companies on their leak sites to pressure victims into paying, to generate publicity, or to create the appearance of success even when they have little or nothing of value. In cases involving public-sector or formerly public bodies like Ekepis, groups have been known to recycle older material, target successor organisations, or list entities that no longer exist in an attempt to extract payment or attention.

Many such listings never receive independent confirmation. Some turn out to contain recycled data from earlier unrelated breaches. Others prove to be exaggerated — the group may have obtained only a small or low-value subset of files. Real confirmation usually comes from the affected organisation itself, a regulator, or forensic analysis that can be examined by security researchers. None of those have happened here. The Gentlemen Ransomware Group has made a claim; that claim remains unverified.

This does not mean you should ignore it. It does mean you should treat the listing as a signal to act on the credentials you can still control rather than assuming every detail in the attackers’ marketing material is accurate.

The pattern of listings against absorbed public bodies

Ransomware groups have repeatedly listed defunct or restructured public-sector organisations on their leak sites. The pattern is well established: when an agency is closed, merged, or succeeded by a new body, attackers sometimes target the old name to pressure the successor entity or simply to keep their leak site looking active. These listings rarely result in confirmed large-scale data theft that affects individuals in predictable ways.

For you, the usable takeaway is simple. When you see a breach claim against an organisation that no longer exists under its original name, the most practical risk is usually credential reuse from accounts you created years ago. The same pattern appears often enough that it is worth checking any old logins you created with Greek public services, education bodies, or certification agencies during the period when Ekepis was active.

What you should do now

1. Change your password on every site where you used the same one as Ekepis. Do this first. Because the storage method is unknown, treat the credential as exposed and eliminate any reuse immediately.
2. Enable two-factor authentication everywhere it is available, especially on email and any accounts that hold financial or official information. A second factor blocks most credential-stuffing attacks even if the password is known.
3. Check your email address on Have I Been Pwned and any similar services to see if it appears in other confirmed incidents from the same period. This helps you understand whether the Ekepis listing is part of a wider pattern of reuse.
4. Contact EOPPEP directly to ask whether they hold any of your old Ekepis records and what their current position is on the listing. As the successor body they are the only organisation that can give you a definitive statement.
5. Monitor your accounts for unusual activity over the next several weeks. Watch for login attempts from unfamiliar locations or password-reset requests you did not initiate.

GalaxyWarden provides continuous monitoring across 13.1B+ breach records and 100+ platforms, along with identity-chain mapping and remediation support by specialists.