Belarus state TV aired a journalist's home address. Does this affect you

On 2 April 2026, Belarusian state channel STV, on a programme hosted by Raman Pratasevich, put private details of exiled journalist Stanislau Ivashkevich on air. The segment showed what was presented as his phone number and home address in Warsaw, private video recordings, and on-screen instructions on how to reach and enter the apartment. It also showed 2022 surveillance footage of a former newsroom.

Pratasevich then listed 20 more journalists — 12 current or recent Belarusian Investigative Center staff, 4 from Buro Media, one Ukrainian and three Russians — and read their dates of birth and the dates they left Belarus. That is 21 people in total. He said they faced criminal cases in Belarus even though they live abroad. Ivashkevich confirmed the broadcast; the Committee to Protect Journalists and other specialist outlets reviewed the original footage. Belarusian authorities and STV did not reply when asked for comment.

This was not a hack of a company you use

Most write-ups treat this as a press-freedom story. That framing is true, and it is not why a non-journalist is searching for it. If you are here because you saw “addresses” and “phone numbers” and wondered whether your own details sat in a stolen file, the honest read is that they did not.

This was not a breach of a bank, a shop, a hospital, or a government database. Nobody stole a customer list. A state television programme named a closed group of 21 exile journalists and, for one of them, put a home and a route to the door on screen. Specialist outlets describe that as intimidation. Television can be copied; it cannot be recalled. But if you are not one of those 21 people, and you do not live in that household, this broadcast did not hand anyone your address, phone, or videos.

Two things the headlines flatten. First, “he had not filed a police report” is not the same as “it did not happen.” A Polish government reply to a Council of Europe alert said Ivashkevich had not yet submitted a formal complaint. The footage still aired; CPJ watched it. Second, the usual word is “doxxing,” which sounds like a name posted online. What was shown for one household was closer to a public notice of how to find a private apartment, plus private video. That is why it is serious for the people named. It is still not a leak of the public.

What to actually expect

• If you are not one of the 21 journalists named on that 2 April programme, and you do not live with them, you should not expect calls, mail, or locked accounts from this incident. Your records were not in it.
• The clip will keep circulating on propaganda channels and spare copies. A complaint about the upload was already sent to YouTube; even if one copy is removed, others remain. That is the near-term reality for the people who were named.
• Polish police and prosecutors told CPJ in April that no complaint had been filed at that time. The later official Polish reply said the same. Any investigation inside Poland starts only if a formal notice is submitted. There is no public confirmation that this has happened yet.
• There will not be a general “change your password” moment, because no login database was allegedly stolen. New criminal charges beyond those already public in 2024 have not been confirmed.

What you can and cannot fix

The broadcast cannot be undone. Whatever address, phone number, and private video were shown on STV on 2 April 2026 are out. They cannot be pulled back from everyone who recorded the programme, and nobody can promise to delete them. It is also not possible to check a name against that programme and tell you whether it was read out. That list is not sitting in anything a public scan searches, and a “clean” result would not mean you were safe.

What still helps, in order:

• If you were not named: you do not need to change passwords, freeze credit, or replace documents because of this incident. Those steps do not match what was aired.
• If you were named, or you share that home: treat the location as known to a hostile audience. Talk to local police about a formal report, review physical security there, and avoid new public posts that confirm you still live at the same place. The television segment is already public; repeating its details helps no one.
• Cut the extra trails that people-search sites add. A single TV record becomes much more useful to anyone who means harm when it is joined to directory listings that pile on relatives, extra phone numbers, employers, and old addresses. Those listings, unlike the broadcast, can often be removed. That is the lever that still works.
• Do not wait for a takedown of the original clip to make you safer. A platform may remove one upload. It does not unsay a live television programme. Reducing what else is listed next to a name is the part that can still change.